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T H E S I S
LIABILITY OF FELLOW SERVANTS IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT
FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY THEM TO EFACH OTHER.
by
John Kern Patterson, Jr.
Cornell University
1895

LIABILITY OF FELLOW SERVANTS IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT
FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY rIIIEM TO EACH OTHER.
Wile actions brought against employers by their servants
and by third persons are very common at the present day, Yet
those actions in which one'se*rvant sues his co-servant under
the same master, to recover for injuries caused by the other
to him are uncommon, and seldom appear in the reports. This
is probably due to the facts that the servant or employee is
not, in general, as responsible a person in a financial way,
as the employee or m.aster is. Such an action as this is us-
ually brought only when the action against the common employer
has failed, by reason of a failure to prove that the amster
'etas not guilty of negligence, or for some reason could not
be held.
But ;hatever may be the reason for thi infrequency of ac-
tions by one servant against his fellow servant, it is never-
theless true that an action does lie in some cases. It is a
well settled principle of law that every person is liable for
his ovn crimes and positive wrongs done to every other person.
A servant is under no less a duty to others to abstain from
committing crimes and positive wrongs, merely because he is a
servant. He cannot shield himself from liability in 
such
cases by showing that he acted under orders from 
his employer.
No p2rsen can authorize another to do a wrong. But every 
one
,wlhether he be master or servant, employer or employee, 
is re-
sponsible to others who are injured.by reason of bisnegli-
Pence in fulfilling obligations resting upon him in his indi-
vidual, character. These are the obligati-ns which the law
imposes upon all pe'sons, independent of contract. No man in-
creases or diminishes his obligations to strangers by becoming
an a-ent or servant; but if, in the course of his agency, he
comes into contact with the person or property of a stranger,
he is liable for ang injury he may do to either, by his negli-
gence in the performance of duties imposed by law upon him, in
cormion with all other mei .
It has be-n held in some cases that 2n action could not ?
maintained by one servant against another in the sL-me employ-
ment, for injuries caused by the other, merely for the reason
that they were fellow servants. That, on reason, such should
not be the case is evident from a consideration of the rela-
tions of master and servant. In such a case, a servant would
have no recovery against any one unless he could prove that
his mster was himself negligent, no matter how careles his
fellow se-vant inih 1  be. In one ol 1he e,l' -ish cases,
that of Southeote v. Stanley, 1 11. & 1-. 247, decided in the
Court of Exchequ'r in 1856, Chief Justice Pollock is soid to
have uttered this dictum:"Neither can one servant nmintain an
action ar'ainst another for negligence while engaged in theirc
cormon employment". But this was mere dictum and another re-
port of the same case does not containit. It hs since been
decided otherwise in later English cases. In Albro v. Jaquith
4 Gr"y, (Mass) page 101, which was an action of tort, brought
a, ainst the superintendent of a cotton and woolen raill in VWes
Springfield, to recover damages for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff, while in the employment of the company, from the
escape of gas, occasioned by the negligence, carelessness and
unskillfulness of the defendant in the management of the appa-
ratus and fixtures used in the mill for the purpose of genera-
ting etc. inflamable gas for the lighting of the mill, Merrick
J., said,- "Many of the considerations of justice and policy,
which led to the adoption of -he general rule, now perfectly
well established, that a part. who employs several persons in
the conduct of some conmon enterprise or undertaking, is not
responsible to any one of them for the injurious consequences
of the mere negligence or carelessness of the others in the
perforrance of their respective duties, have an equal signif-
icancy and force when applied to actions brought for like
cause by one servant against another. In the latter, as in
the former case, they re presumed to understond knd appreci-
ate the ordinary risk and peril incident to the service in
which they ar e employed, and to pr-edicate the compensation
they are to receive, in some weasure, upon the extent of the
hazard they assun . The knowledge that no legal redress is -4
forded for damages occasioned by the inattention or unfaith-
fulness of other laborers engaged in the same common work,
will naturally induce such one to be not only a strict observ-
er of the conduct of others, but to be more prudent and care-
ful himself, and thus by increased vigilance to p.romote the
,,elfare ard safety of all". In Osborn v. Morgan, 130 Mass.
102, which was an action for damages brought by one servant a-
gainst his fellows servant, Judge Gray, commenting on the case
of Albro v. Jaquith, supra, says, "Upon consideration, we are
all of the opinion that that judgement is mpported by no sat-
isfactory reasons and must be over-ruled." And at page 105,
he says:"Even the master 's not exempt fromliability to his
servants for his own negligence; and the servants make no con-
tract with, ari receive no compensation from each other. It
may vell be doubted whether a knowledge, on the part of the
servants tht they were in no event to be responsible in dima-
ges to cne another, would bend to make each more careful and
prudent himself." Griffiths v. Wolfrain, 22 Minn. 185 :nd
Hinds v. Harbou, 58 Ind. 321, -nnimerous other authoritios ae
to the same effect. Both on rc-ason and authority, therefore,
it seems to be well settled at the present day that the fact
that they are fello-a servants will not be an obstacle in the
wiav, of a recovery.
The authorities being unanimous at the present day in
holding that the f-ct that the parties are fellow servants,
does not inferfere with the right of action, let us see in
what cases one servant may recover against another, a fellow-
servant, for injuries caused by the latter. We have already
seen that a recovery may be had by one servant against another
for his crimes and positive wromgs. But re fellow servants
liable to each other negligence, or only for their misfeas-
ance, as distingulihed from their nonfeasance? Misfeasance
isthe doing what a person rnay lawfully do, in an improp.Sr man-
ner. Nonfeasance is the not doing of that which it is a per-
don's duty to do. By the weight of authority in most of the
states a distinction ismade between misfeasance and nonfeas-
ance, the servant being held answerable for theformer but not
for the latter. Such a distinction seems unjust, at the
least. The idea that a servant in charge of a piece of work
is to be hsld civilly liable, wh re he i.:kes an honest at-
tempt to perform his duty, but through an unintentional blun-
der, does the work allotted to him in what is callod a care-
less and negligent manner ; while another servant engaged in
the saye line of wQrk ana under the same obligation, who posi-
tively andintentionally fails or refuses to pe'form his work
in any part is to be excused from all liability to one injured
by or through his non performancet aeems unjust indeed. Grif-
fiths v. Wolfrain, 22 Minn. 185, was an action brought by a
plaintiff to recover for injuries received by him through the
negligence of the defendants, fellow servants with him, in
constructing an arch. No distinction was made in this case
between misfeasance and non feasance, although it was clearly
a case of misfeasance, or the improper doing of what a person
might lawfully do. Giltian, C. J., at page 187, says, "Who-
ever was guilty of the negligence if there was any, is liable
to the plaintiff, unless there was contributory negligence on
his part, for any injury which he sustained by reason of it.
This liability does not rest upon any liability imposed by
privity of contract, for in such cases there may not be, and
frequently is not, any such privity. But the duty of each to
do the work with proper care grew out of the relation which
existed between them as persons engaged in the same work, in
which the negligent or unskillful performance of his ra rt by
one may cause danger to the others, in which each must depend
for his safety upon the good faith, skill an.] prudence of each
of the others in doing his prt of the wiork, then it is the duiT
of each to t];eiothers engaged in'the work, to exercise the
care and skill ordinarily employed by prtdent men in similar
circumstances." Blinds v. Harbou, 58 Ind. 121, was an action
brought by Harbou, a carpenter in the employ of Studebaker
Brothers Manufacturing Company against the defendant Hines and
the company. It appeared that the plaintiff was at work as a
earpenter on the second story of the building near the wall
which fell, and that he knew nothing of the character of the
excavation going on at the foot of !.he wall; which excavating
was so negligently done at the direction of the defendant,
Hines, tha- the wall fell ardinjured the plaintiff. In this
case also, no distinction was inde between misfeasance and
nonfeasance, the court saying at page 126, "The point is made
that this action will not lie; that a setvant isnot liable for
injuries happening through the negligence to a fellow servant
in the employment of the same mster in the same general bus-
iness. Albro v. Jaquith-; Southcote v. rStanley. Elementary
writers doubt or deny the authority of these cases. We do
not clearly perceive how it may well be that in the little
cormunity of employees of the same orployer, uipon ti-B same gen
eral undertaking, the ccnmon dutiesof man to man in society
generally should cease to exist, and as a consequence, liabil-
ity for breaches of them. We Lhink the action may be main-
tained." In this last case the court had before it the dis-
tinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, because it cited
the cases of Albro v. Jaquith and outhcote v. St3nley, al-
though it did not follow them, but held that an action would
lie for negligence generally.
In New York there is a well settled distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance. The first case in this state in
which the question, as to the liability of one fellow servantt
to another for injuries, came up, was in Fort v. Whipple, 11
Hun, 586. In that case it W al'predt that one Shipman con-
tracted to build a bridge and employed the defendant, a skill-
ful builder, and gave him the sole managemen and contrel of
the work and of the manner of carrying it on, all the other
employees being in all respects subject to his orders. Undrr
defendant 's direct ion and supervision o scaffold was erected,
secured by stay laths, upr which laborers viorked and anter-
ials were placed. Some of these laths wcra remved by the di-
rection of the defend:11nt, the plaintiff aiding in so doing.
Subsequently the scaffold fell and the plaintiff was injured
thereby. The court, by E'ockes, J., after holding that 'he de-
fendant was an alter ego of 1he principal and that therefore
there was no insuperable difficulty in lw growinm, out of the
relation of the parties to each other as coemployoes, said,
"WIe are not now called upon to decide the question whether an
action may or may not be maintianed forne.-ligence by one em-
ployee a)3ainst another where both :.,re engaged in the same ser-
vice under a con-on employer, in a case where the latter woula
not be lable. Of course an action would lie in such a cse
for a direct injury as a trespass', butperhaps there might be a
question whether an action would lie in such a case for a mere
nonfeasance or neglect of duty." Jurray v. Usher, 117 1'. Y.
542, was an action brought by plaintiff to recover damages for
alleged negligence causing the death of Blanchard, plaintiff's
intestate, who was r.eemployed by the defendants 1urray and Ush-
er as a day laborer in their saw mill. While so employed a
platform on which he was fell, and he received inji-wies caus-
ing his death. Lewis and the plaintiff's intestate wete co-
servants of tho owners of the mill, the former having gener-
al charge and superintendence of the business under the super-
vision of the owners, who themselves gave directions from tim
tine to time. They instructed Lewis to look after the neces-
sary repairs and the evidence justified t1e inference that, in
respect to the platform, he oimmitted to perform his duty. An-
drews , J., said, "The general rule of respondeat superior
charges t1e nster with liability for the servant's negligence
in the master's business causing injury to third persons. They
may in general treat the actsof the servant as the acts of the
master. But the aent or servnnt ishimself liable as well as
the master where the act producing the injury, although com-
mitted in the master's business, is a direct trespass by the
servant upon the person or property of another, or where he i4
rects the tortious act. In such cases the fact that he is act
ing for another does not shield him from responsibility. The
distinction is between misfeasance and nonfeasance. For the
former the servant is, in general, liable; for the latter not.
The servant, as between himself and his master, is bound to
serva him with fidelity and to perform the duties committed to
him. An omission to perform them may subject third persons
to harm and he master to damages. Eut the breach of the co4i
tract of service is a matter between the master and servant a-
lone, and the nonfeasance of the servant causing injury is
not, in 7eneral at least, a ground for a civil action a gainst
the servant in their favor." The Llurray case was followed in
a late case in the Supreme Court of i:Tew York, lurns v. Pethcal
27 1,*. Y. Supp. 503, in which Liartin, J., delivering the opin-
ion says:- "The question is presented whwther this action
could be maintained by the plaintiff to recover for the death
of her intestate against the defendant who was a coemployee.
'T7his question was raised by the defendant's motion for a non-
suit, made at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, and re-
newed after all the evidence in the case had been received.
One of the grounds of the motion was thatthere was no such re-
lation existing between two coamployeee as authorized one to
bring an action against another on the ground of negligence.
The English authorities upon the question of the liability of
a serv:ant or agent to a third per-son for on act or omission
performed or omitted by him while engaged in the business of
the i-imster, are to the effect that the servant is liable for
misfeasance, though the act be in obedience to the master's
order, but not for mere nonfeasance or omission of duty to
third persons, but only to the master, who Alone is :.nswerable
to third persons for the master's neglect. We think it may
be safely said thal the English rule prev-ils generally in
this and other states, notwithstanding the broad declarations
of some judges and text writers to the effect that a servant
is liable to third persons injured by his negligence, either
alone or jointly with his master. The conflict with the au-
thorities upon the question is more apparent than real. It
has arisen from a failure to observe clearly the distinction
between misfoasance and nonfeasance, and from an omission to
point out the fact that, while a servant is liable in the one
case, he isnot in the other. Disregarding this distinction,
some judges and authors have stated in generl terms, that a
servant is liable for his own negligence to a person injured
thereby. Such a statement is inaccurate and misleading. Non-
feasance is the onission of an act which a person ought to 'o.
Misfeasance is the improper doing of an t which a person
might lawfully do. If the duty omitted b-1 the agent or ser,
vant devolved upon him purely from his agency or enmployment,
his ommission is only of a duty he owes his principal or mas-
ter, and the a'aster alone is liable; while if the duty rested
upon him in his individual char-,cter, and was one that the l:w
0
imposed upon him independent of his agency or employment, then
he is liable. That such is the doctrine in this state, anI
that when applied to the case before us, it requires us to
hold that this action cannot be maintained, is rendered quite
rpanifest, we think, by an examination of the case of MIurray
v. Usher, supra". Other cases in support of this distinction
are Fetters v. Swan, 62 Iliss. 415; Delaney v. Rochereau, 34
La. Ann. 1123; Reid v. Hub9r49 Ga. 207; Labadie v Hawley, 61
Tex. 177; Osborne v. Mlorgan, 13 :ass. 102; Albro v. Jaquith,
4 Gray (Mass.) 101.
We have seen that by the weight of authority a servant
is answerable civilly for misfeasance as distinguished from
nonfeasance, rather than for his negligence generally. For
his negligence not consisting of misfeasance, he is responsi-
ble only to his master. But how are we to distinguish be-
tween misfeasance and nonfeasance? How to apply the distinc-
tion to a given case? Mt must necessarily be very difficult
6f application. Judge Story says, in section 309 of his work
on agency, "The distinction thus propounded, between misfeas-
ance and nonfeasance,- between acts of direct, positive wrong
and mere neglects by agents, as to their personal liability
therefor, iray seem nice and artificial and partakes perhaps,
not a little of the aubtility and over refinement of the old
doctrines of the coinon law. Tt seems, however, to be founded
upon this ground, that no authority from a superior c-n fur-
nish to any party 11 just defence for his own positive torts
and trespasses; for no man can authorize another to do a posi-
tive wrong. But in respect to nonfeasance or nero neglects
in the performance of duty, the responsibility therefor must a
rise from some express or inplied obligation between particu-
lar parties standing in priority of law and contract with each
otber, aid no man isbound to answer for any such violation
of duty or obligation, except to those *to whom he has become
directly bound or answerable for his conduct. Whether the
distinction be satisfactory or not, it is well established, 4
though some niceties and difficulties occasionally occur in
its practical application to firticular cases". Let us see
how the cases apply the distinction.
Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray (Mass.) 309, was an action
brought by plaintiff to recover damages from the defendant for
causing water to over-flow from a sink in a seccnd Story of a
building to the first floor, thus danagini some goods belong-
ing to the plaintiff. It appeared that the board of water
commissioners had caused the water to be shut off from the
premises for non-payment of the water rates, and that the de-
fendant, who was the agent of his wife, who o-ned the premises
being informed that one of the tenants wanted the water, went
to the wster comissioner, paid the water rates, ari directed
the water to be let on, which was dane; and the faucet in an
upppr room was left open so th.t the wviter, after filling the
sink,overflowed and soaked through the floor into the plain-
tiff's shop and damaged his property. Eletcalf, J., delivering
the orinion said, "The defendant's omission to examine the
state of the pipes in the house before causing the water to be
turned on, was a nonfeasance. But if he had not caused the
water to be let on, that nonfeasance would not htve injured
the plaintiff. If he had examined the pipes and left them in
a proper condition, and then caused the letl ing on of the wa-
ter, there would have beea neither nonfeasance nor rnisfeas-
ance. As the facts are the nonfeasance caused the act done
to be a misfeasance. But from which did the plaintiff suffer?
Clearly from the act done, which was no less a misfeasance, by
reason of its being preceded by a nonfeasance." Howell v.
Wright, 3 Allen (Mass.) 167, was an action of tort to recover
damges for injuries to the plainififf sustained by falling
into the Ch:,rles River in the night time, at the draw of' the
Warren Dridge, through the negligence of the defendant who was
the tender of the draw-bridge, in not Thutting the gates and
hanging out lanterns while opening the draw. Dewey, J., who
delivered the opinion, said,"Under these circtunstances, t per-
sonal liability attached to him for an injury to a third per-
son, caused by his improper discharge of his duties. His act
was not a mere naked act of nonfeasance. The opening of' the
draw was the c-use of the injury. That act was done by the
defendatit. I. is true that it was lawful and prorer to open
the draw, but stich opening was to be done in a prer manner.
That required due regard and caution for the safety of trav-
ellers passing the bridge, anI the use of reasonable safe-
guards for their protection. The defendant, by omitting to
discharge his duty in this respect, may be held responsible
for an injury occasioned thereby."
Albro v. Jaquith, 4 Gray (Mass.) 99, was an action of
tort brought against the superintendent of a cotton and woolen
mill at West Springfield to recover damages for injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiff, while in the employrent of the com-
pany, from the escape of gas, occasioned by the carelessness
negligence and unskillfulness of the defendant in the manage-
ment of the apparatus and fixtures used in the mill for the
purpose of generating, containing, conducting etc., inflamma-
b&e gas for the lighting of the mill. L1errick, J., said, " ITo
misfeasance of positive act of wrong i.; chsrged or imputed to
the defendant. The wiole gvound of :oniplaint against him is b
that, having the care and superintendence of the fixtures for
the purpose of generating gas etc., he was negligent, careless
and unskillful in the management of them. His obligation to
be faithful and diligent in this particular resulted either
from an express con ract with with his principal or is to be
implied from the nature and character of the service in which
he was engaged. I'nd because thi's is the sole origin and foun-
dation of his duty, he is responsible only to the pwty to
whom it is due for the injurious consequences of neglecting it
She therefore c.n have no legal right to conplain of his care-
lessness or unfaithfulness; for he he had mde himself by no
act or contract, accountable to her." This case was comment-
ed on by the highest court of M assachusetts in the case of
Osborne v. Morgan, 130 1'.ass. 102, and was declared to be over-
ruled. In this latter case it appeared that whdle the plain-
tiff was at work as a carpenter in the establishment of a man-
ufacturing corporation, putting up by direction of the corpo-
tation certain partitions in a room in which the corporation
was conducting the business of making wire, the defendants,
one the superintendent and the others agents and servants of
the corporation, being employed in that business, negligently
and without regard to the safety of persons rightfully in the
room, placed a tackle block and chains upon an iron rail sus-
pended from the ceiling of the room, and suffered them to re-
main there in such a manner, and so unprotected from felling,
that by reason ther6eof they fell upon and injured the plain-
tiff. Judge Gray said: "But, upon consideration, we are all
of the opinion that that judgment (Albro v. Jaquith, supra)
issupported by no satisfactory reasons and must be overruled.
The principal reason assigned was, that no misfeasance or pos-
itive act of wrong was charged, and that for nonfeasance,
which was merely negligence in the performance of a duty aris-
ing from some express or implied contract with his principal
or employer, an agent or servant was responsible to him only,
and not to any thrd person. It is often said in the books
that an agent is responsible to third persons for misfeasance
only and not for nonfeasance. And it is doubtless true that
if an agent never does anything towards carrying out his con-
tract with his principal, but wholly omits and neglects to do
so, the principal is *he only one who can maintain any 9ction
against him for nonfeasance. But if the agent once undertakes
and enters upon :he execution of a particular work, it is his
duty to use partic!?lar and - asonable care in the manner of
executing it, so :s not to cause any injury to third persas
which may be the natural consequences of his acts, and he
cannot by abandoning its execution midway, and leaving 'hings
in a dangerous condition, exempt himself from liability to any
person who suffers injury by reason of hi; having so left them
without prpper safeguards. This is not nonfeasance or doing
nothing; but it is misfeasance or doing improperly. Negli-
genceo and unskillfuleess in the management of inflammable gas
by reason of which it escapes and causes injury, can no more
be considered as mere nonfeasance within the meaning of the
rule relied on than negligence in the control of water as in
Bell v. Josselyn, etc. supra,. In the case at bar the negli-
gent hangirkg and keepirg by the defendants of the block and
chains, in such a place and manner as to be in danger of fall-
ing upon persons underneath, was a misfeasance or improper
dealing with instruments in the defendants' actual use or con-
trol."
In all four of these cases last cited there was a direct
act, which though perfectly lawful and proper of itself, be-
came a misfeasance by reason of its being connected with a
nonfeasance in such a way as to cause injury. They were all
cases of doing that which a person might lawfully do, but in
an improl;er m'vnner. Those cases were all within the de fini-
tion of, and the rule a; to misfeasance. Rut let us take the
vase where the only act dor consisted in undertaking a par-
ticular work. It may be perfectly lawful and lroper to do so,
and generally is, but may it not become a misfeasance by rea-
son of being joined or connected with a nonfeasance by the
same prson, just as any other act may be. I think so. El-
lis v. iLlciaughton, 76 ,\Iich. 237, was an action for damages
brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for allowing a
sidewalk to remain torn up. It appeared that the defendant
was the agent of his wife and superintended the erection of a
builAing in fromt of which plaintiff vs injured. A portion of
the sidewalk was removed, against the orders of the defendant,
while the building was going on, to permit teams to go in from
the street to the lot. The wagons, in passing through, made
ruts. The plaintiff fell into one of these ruts in the night
time and was injured. Morse J., said in delivering the opin-
ion,"The negligence charged in the declaration was not alone
the tearing up or removal of the walk, but also in allowing it
to remain torn up and in a dangerotus condition from April un-
til the time of the injury. Every day it was so permitted to
remain, when the defendant had the entire control of it, and
the authority without question to repiaae it, was a wrong and
a misfeasance. It was his duty, knowing that the walk was re-
:.oved, to hav it put down again and male reasonably safe for
travel. Chief Justice Gray, in Osborn v. Morgan (cited supra)
130 Mass. 102, says, 'It is often said in the books that an a-
gent is responsible for misfeasance only, and not for nonfeas-
ance - - - But, if the agent once actually undertakes and en-
ters upon the execttion of a particular work, it is his duty 0
to use reasonable care in the marner of executing it, so as n
not to cause any injury to third pers ns which may be the nat-
ural consequences of his acts; and he cannot, by abandoning
its execution midway, and leaving things in a dangerous condi-
tion, exempt himself from liability to any person who suffers
injury by reason of his having so left them without proper
9afeguards. This is not nonfeasance or doing nothing; but it
is doing misfeasance,- doing improperly'. In the case before
us the defendant had entered upon the work of erecting this
building Irrespective of his relation to his principal
he was bound while doing the work to so use the premises, in-
cluding this sidewalk, as not to injure others. Misfeasance
May involve to some extent the idea of not doing; as where an
agent, while engaged in the performance of his undertaking,
does not do something which it was his duty to do under the
circumstances; as for instance, when he does not exercise that
care which a due regard for the rights of others would require
This is not doing, but it is the not doing of that which is
not imposed upon the agent merely by his relation to his prin-
cipal, but of that which is imposed upon him by law as a re-
sponsible individual in common with all other members of so-
ciety. It is the sane not doing which constitutes negligence
in any relation, and is actionable."
This case would seem to support the proposition that if
a servant once undertakes a particular work, he is liable for
a want of due care in executing it. But of course, if he does
not begin the wsork, although he contracted to do so, he is not
liable. A good case in support of this proposition is Osborn
v. Morgan,supra,. However all of the courts do not seem to
sustain this Iroposition. Iurray v. Usher,supra, is one, al-
though in that case it was not necessary to the decision. In
that case the defendant was instructed to look after the re-
23.
pairs but failed to do so, and although not necessary for t
the decision, the court said it was a nonfeasance.
I think that the better doctrine is otherwise,but the
courts are not unanimous on this subject as yet.

